Files
poli0981andClaude Fable 5.2 fa8dbaf92b docs: put the project in maintenance mode
The project is stable: no new features, code changes only for security
advisories and runtime/dependency updates, and issues and pull requests
are for the data (add, correct, remove a game).

- README: status, build, quality, version, licence and runtime badges, a
  "Project status" section, and a data-first Contribute section
- CONTRIBUTING, SECURITY, Contact, the PR template and CLAUDE.md state
  the same policy
- Issue forms: add_game and edit_game are new; feature_request, feedback
  and off_topic are removed; blank issues are off (config.yml)
- About page: "Report something" links the five remaining forms

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-11 20:49:27 +07:00

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# Security policy
## What this project actually is
The previous version of this file said the repository was "just a Markdown
list… no executable code, no dependencies, no backend, no user data." That was
wrong on every count, so here is the real picture:
- a **Cloudflare Worker** serving the site. It holds a D1 binding, an R2
bucket for the game art (public at `media.free-steam-games.win`), a
15-minute cron (reconcile, auto-approve, and minting the art into that
bucket), and, for the admin path, a credential that can write to this
repository
- a **SvelteKit / Svelte 5 web app**, prerendered to static pages, with a few
dozen npm dependencies, plus the `/admin` app embedded in the Worker
- a **Tauri 2 desktop and Android app**, signed, with an auto-updater
- a **Python pipeline** run by GitHub Actions. The data jobs push to `main`
with the built-in `GITHUB_TOKEN`; the release jobs hold the app signing keys
Operational hardening (headers, HSTS, rate limiting, WAF) is documented in
[`docs/SECURITY_SETUP.md`](docs/SECURITY_SETUP.md), with a check command for
each item.
There is genuinely something to attack here. Hence a real policy.
## Reporting
**Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting**, which is enabled on this
repository: *Security → Report a vulnerability*. It is private between you and
the maintainer.
If that does not work for you, email **security@poli0981.dev**. The same
address is published in [`AUTHORS.md`](AUTHORS.md),
[`docs/Contact.md`](docs/Contact.md), [`username.txt`](username.txt) and
<https://free-steam-games.win/.well-known/security.txt>.
That `security.txt` is the machine-readable version of this policy
(RFC 9116). Its `Policy` field points back at this file and its `Canonical`
field at itself; if the two ever disagree, **this file wins** and the
`security.txt` is stale.
**Please do not open a public issue for anything exploitable.** Public issues
are fine for a dead link or a game that is no longer free — those are data
problems, not security ones.
Useful report: what you did, what happened, why it matters, and how to
reproduce. A proof-of-concept URL beats a paragraph of description.
## In scope
- The Cloudflare Worker (`web/worker/**`) — the data proxy, the image proxy,
and anything reachable under `/api/*`
- The `/admin` path and `/api/ingest/*`, and their Cloudflare Access gates
- The D1 database and anything that writes to it
- The media host, `media.free-steam-games.win` (the R2 bucket's public
domain), and whatever the cron writes to it
- The GitHub Actions workflows, especially any path where untrusted input
reaches a step that can push to `main`
- The Tauri updater, its signing key, and its feed at `/api/updates/desktop`
- Dependency vulnerabilities that are actually reachable from shipped code
Things worth probing specifically: making `/img/*` fetch an origin that is not
`shared.akamai.steamstatic.com` or `shared.fastly.steamstatic.com` (or, for
the avatars under `/img/gh/*`, `avatars.githubusercontent.com`); making
`/api/data/*` return a path outside its allowlist; reaching admin
functionality without an Access session; getting the update feed to offer a
file that is not this repository's release download.
## Out of scope
- Games in the list being bad, predatory, or full of microtransactions. Take it
up with the developer.
- Anything about Valve or Steam itself.
- Missing security headers with no demonstrated impact, and scanner output
pasted without a working exploit.
- Denial of service by volume.
- Getting past the website's Turnstile human check from your own browser. It is
a client-side gate on purpose: the pages are static and the catalogue API is
public by design (`docs/ToS.md` §9), so it guards nothing a script cannot
already read. A way to make `/api/human-check` accept a token Cloudflare
rejected is in scope.
- Social engineering of the maintainer.
- Accessibility barriers. They are real bugs, but not security ones: see
[`ACCESSIBILITY.md`](ACCESSIBILITY.md).
## What to expect
One person, as a hobby, in a timezone that is probably not yours. A first reply
usually within a week. Serious issues get fixed before they are discussed
publicly; minor ones may sit for a while.
No bounty programme, no money — the disclaimers about the maintainer being
broke are not a joke. Credit in `docs/ACKNOWLEDGEMENTs.md` if you want it.
## Supported versions
The deployed site and `main` are the only supported versions. Desktop and
Android releases are supported at the latest tag only; there are no backports.
The project is stable and in maintenance mode (see
[`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md)): no new features are developed, and
security fixes and runtime / dependency updates are exactly what it is still
maintained for. Dependabot, CodeQL and SonarCloud keep running, and a fix
ships as a new site deploy and, when the apps are affected, a new app release.