Files
poli0981andClaude Fable 5.2 fa8dbaf92b docs: put the project in maintenance mode
The project is stable: no new features, code changes only for security
advisories and runtime/dependency updates, and issues and pull requests
are for the data (add, correct, remove a game).

- README: status, build, quality, version, licence and runtime badges, a
  "Project status" section, and a data-first Contribute section
- CONTRIBUTING, SECURITY, Contact, the PR template and CLAUDE.md state
  the same policy
- Issue forms: add_game and edit_game are new; feature_request, feedback
  and off_topic are removed; blank issues are off (config.yml)
- About page: "Report something" links the five remaining forms

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-11 20:49:27 +07:00

4.8 KiB

Security policy

What this project actually is

The previous version of this file said the repository was "just a Markdown list… no executable code, no dependencies, no backend, no user data." That was wrong on every count, so here is the real picture:

  • a Cloudflare Worker serving the site. It holds a D1 binding, an R2 bucket for the game art (public at media.free-steam-games.win), a 15-minute cron (reconcile, auto-approve, and minting the art into that bucket), and, for the admin path, a credential that can write to this repository
  • a SvelteKit / Svelte 5 web app, prerendered to static pages, with a few dozen npm dependencies, plus the /admin app embedded in the Worker
  • a Tauri 2 desktop and Android app, signed, with an auto-updater
  • a Python pipeline run by GitHub Actions. The data jobs push to main with the built-in GITHUB_TOKEN; the release jobs hold the app signing keys

Operational hardening (headers, HSTS, rate limiting, WAF) is documented in docs/SECURITY_SETUP.md, with a check command for each item.

There is genuinely something to attack here. Hence a real policy.

Reporting

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting, which is enabled on this repository: Security → Report a vulnerability. It is private between you and the maintainer.

If that does not work for you, email security@poli0981.dev. The same address is published in AUTHORS.md, docs/Contact.md, username.txt and https://free-steam-games.win/.well-known/security.txt.

That security.txt is the machine-readable version of this policy (RFC 9116). Its Policy field points back at this file and its Canonical field at itself; if the two ever disagree, this file wins and the security.txt is stale.

Please do not open a public issue for anything exploitable. Public issues are fine for a dead link or a game that is no longer free — those are data problems, not security ones.

Useful report: what you did, what happened, why it matters, and how to reproduce. A proof-of-concept URL beats a paragraph of description.

In scope

  • The Cloudflare Worker (web/worker/**) — the data proxy, the image proxy, and anything reachable under /api/*
  • The /admin path and /api/ingest/*, and their Cloudflare Access gates
  • The D1 database and anything that writes to it
  • The media host, media.free-steam-games.win (the R2 bucket's public domain), and whatever the cron writes to it
  • The GitHub Actions workflows, especially any path where untrusted input reaches a step that can push to main
  • The Tauri updater, its signing key, and its feed at /api/updates/desktop
  • Dependency vulnerabilities that are actually reachable from shipped code

Things worth probing specifically: making /img/* fetch an origin that is not shared.akamai.steamstatic.com or shared.fastly.steamstatic.com (or, for the avatars under /img/gh/*, avatars.githubusercontent.com); making /api/data/* return a path outside its allowlist; reaching admin functionality without an Access session; getting the update feed to offer a file that is not this repository's release download.

Out of scope

  • Games in the list being bad, predatory, or full of microtransactions. Take it up with the developer.
  • Anything about Valve or Steam itself.
  • Missing security headers with no demonstrated impact, and scanner output pasted without a working exploit.
  • Denial of service by volume.
  • Getting past the website's Turnstile human check from your own browser. It is a client-side gate on purpose: the pages are static and the catalogue API is public by design (docs/ToS.md §9), so it guards nothing a script cannot already read. A way to make /api/human-check accept a token Cloudflare rejected is in scope.
  • Social engineering of the maintainer.
  • Accessibility barriers. They are real bugs, but not security ones: see ACCESSIBILITY.md.

What to expect

One person, as a hobby, in a timezone that is probably not yours. A first reply usually within a week. Serious issues get fixed before they are discussed publicly; minor ones may sit for a while.

No bounty programme, no money — the disclaimers about the maintainer being broke are not a joke. Credit in docs/ACKNOWLEDGEMENTs.md if you want it.

Supported versions

The deployed site and main are the only supported versions. Desktop and Android releases are supported at the latest tag only; there are no backports.

The project is stable and in maintenance mode (see CONTRIBUTING.md): no new features are developed, and security fixes and runtime / dependency updates are exactly what it is still maintained for. Dependabot, CodeQL and SonarCloud keep running, and a fix ships as a new site deploy and, when the apps are affected, a new app release.