chore(ci): pin actions to SHAs, add weekly OSV scan, enforce install-script allowlist
Three supply-chain gaps, two of which the repo already claimed to have closed. 1. Actions were pinned to floating tags (`actions/checkout@v7`). A tag is mutable, so CI executed whatever that tag pointed at on the day it ran. Now pinned to commit SHAs with the version in a trailing comment; the existing github-actions Dependabot ecosystem keeps both in sync. 2. Weekly OSV scan (.github/workflows/osv-scanner.yml). docs 06 §6 and 08 §2 both require one and none existed. It complements the per-PR audit gate: `npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high` only sees the production tree and only fails on high+, while OSV covers the whole lockfile against the full database. Also runs on PRs that touch package-lock.json so a bad bump is caught on the PR instead of up to a week later. It runs the scanner directly rather than the reusable SARIF workflow, because SARIF upload needs `security-events: write` plus code scanning, which this plan does not have. A non-zero exit failing the run is the alert. Switch to the reusable workflow once the repo is public and code scanning is free. osv-scanner.toml carries one suppression: gray-matter -> js-yaml@3.15.0 (GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj), which has no patched 3.x and only ever parses our own committed frontmatter at build time. It has an `untilDate` so it expires and gets re-argued rather than becoming permanent. 3. Install-script hardening. `.npmrc` asserted "ignore-scripts is applied in CI" and that sharp needed scripts. Both were false: ci.yml never set it, and sharp@0.35 ships prebuilt @img/sharp-* binaries with no install script at all. Replaced with npm 11's allowlist model, which is what docs 06 §6 actually asks for: package.json#allowScripts names the four packages that legitimately have install scripts (esbuild, workerd, lefthook, fsevents) and .npmrc sets strict-allow-scripts so anything unreviewed is a hard failure. Verified in a clean directory: with strict on and esbuild NOT allow-listed, `npm install` exits 1 with ESTRICTALLOWSCRIPTS; with it allow-listed, it succeeds. A dependency that suddenly grows a postinstall now stops the build instead of executing it. Also: job-level `permissions:` on the build job, and dependabot.yml's stale note about /workers/widgets corrected — the worker exists now; it is skipped because it is deliberately dependency-free and has no manifest to read. Verified: prettier, eslint, astro check (0 errors), knip, build + CSP guard, audit gate all green; `npm ci --dry-run` confirms lockfile and package.json stay in sync. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
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version: 2
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updates:
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# Root npm project. `/workers/widgets` is intentionally omitted until that worker exists.
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# Root npm project. `/workers/widgets` is still omitted, but the reason has changed:
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# the worker exists now, it is just deliberately dependency-free (no package.json, the
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# YouTube RSS is hand-parsed), so there is no manifest for Dependabot to read. Add an
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# entry here the day that worker gains a package.json.
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- package-ecosystem: npm
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directory: "/"
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schedule:
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@@ -21,16 +21,25 @@ concurrency:
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jobs:
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build:
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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# Job-level too, so a second job added later can't silently inherit something wider.
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permissions:
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contents: read
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v7
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# Actions are pinned to commit SHAs, not tags: a tag is mutable, so `@v7` would
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# execute whatever that tag points at on the day CI runs. Dependabot's
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# github-actions ecosystem updates the pins and keeps the version comment in sync.
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- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
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with:
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fetch-depth: 0 # check-exif diffs changed images against the base ref
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- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
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- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7.0.0
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with:
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node-version-file: .nvmrc
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cache: npm
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# Lifecycle scripts run only for the packages allow-listed in package.json
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# #allowScripts; .npmrc sets strict-allow-scripts so anything unreviewed is a
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# hard install failure rather than a warning (docs 06 §6, anti-worm).
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- name: Install
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run: npm ci
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@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
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name: OSV scan
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# docs 06 §6 and 08 §2 both call for a weekly dependency scan; this is it.
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# It complements the per-PR `npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high` gate in ci.yml:
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# audit only sees the production tree and only fails on high+, while OSV covers the
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# whole lockfile (devDependencies included) against the full OSV database.
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on:
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schedule:
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# Mondays 03:17 UTC — off the hour, where scheduled-runner contention is lowest.
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- cron: "17 3 * * 1"
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workflow_dispatch:
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# Re-run when the dependency graph itself changes, so a bad bump is caught on the PR
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# rather than up to a week later.
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pull_request:
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paths: ["package-lock.json", "osv-scanner.toml"]
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permissions:
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contents: read
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concurrency:
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group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
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cancel-in-progress: true
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jobs:
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scan:
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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permissions:
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contents: read
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
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# The scanner runs directly rather than via google/osv-scanner-action's reusable
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# SARIF workflow: SARIF upload needs `security-events: write` plus code scanning,
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# which is not available on this plan. A non-zero exit failing the run is the
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# alert. Once the repo is public, code scanning becomes free and this can be
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# switched to the reusable workflow for findings in the Security tab.
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- uses: google/osv-scanner-action/osv-scanner-action@8deb546fdb875b9996d27d4950be7312dac076a1 # v2.5.0
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with:
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scan-args: |-
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--lockfile=package-lock.json
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@@ -1,4 +1,11 @@
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# Supply-chain hardening (ignore-scripts) is applied in CI only — see docs 06 §1.6.
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# Locally we leave install scripts enabled so `sharp` can set up its binaries
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# for build-time image processing (astro imageService: 'compile').
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# Supply-chain hardening (docs 06 §6). npm >= 11 resolves lifecycle scripts against
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# package.json#allowScripts; `strict-allow-scripts` turns "package X has an install
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# script you haven't reviewed" from a warning into a failed install. A dependency that
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# suddenly grows a postinstall — the Shai-Hulud worm shape — stops the build instead of
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# executing. Review it, then `npm approve-scripts <pkg>` to add it to the allowlist.
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#
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# The previous note here claimed CI applied `ignore-scripts` and that `sharp` needed
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# scripts. Both were wrong: CI never set it, and sharp@0.35 ships prebuilt @img/sharp-*
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# binaries with no install script at all.
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fund=false
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strict-allow-scripts=true
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@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
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# Suppressions for the weekly OSV scan (.github/workflows/osv-scanner.yml).
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#
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# Rules for adding an entry:
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# - every entry carries `untilDate`, so a suppression expires and gets re-argued
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# instead of quietly becoming permanent;
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# - `reason` must say why it is not exploitable HERE, not merely that it is annoying;
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# - if a fix ships, delete the entry rather than extending the date.
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[[IgnoredVulns]]
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id = "GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj"
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untilDate = 2026-11-10T00:00:00Z
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reason = """
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js-yaml 3.x quadratic CPU in !!omap resolution, reached via gray-matter@4 -> js-yaml@3.15.0.
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There is no patched 3.x — the fix was not backported — and gray-matter needs the v3 API
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(safeLoad), so the js-yaml override in package.json is deliberately scoped to ^4.
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Not exploitable here: gray-matter is a devDependency used only by scripts/gen-og.mjs at
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build time, and the only YAML it ever parses is our own committed content frontmatter.
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No untrusted YAML reaches it. Revisit if gray-matter is replaced or ships a v4 engine.
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"""
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@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
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"engines": {
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"node": ">=24"
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},
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"allowScripts": {
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"esbuild": true,
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"workerd": true,
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"lefthook": true,
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"fsevents": true
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},
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"scripts": {
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"dev": "astro dev",
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"build": "astro build && node scripts/gen-og.mjs && pagefind --site dist/client && node scripts/check-csp-hashes.mjs",
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