Files
youtube-generator/.github/workflows/security.yml
T
poli0981andClaude Opus 5.5 a70580e703 ci: security, licensing and style gates; pin every action by SHA
New checks
- security.yml: dependency-review blocks PRs that add a high/critical
  advisory; actionlint + zizmor lint the workflows themselves (template
  injection, permissions, credential persistence, unpinned uses); OpenSSF
  Scorecard weekly and on main (published, not uploaded as alerts).
- compliance.yml: REUSE lint over the whole repo (REUSE.toml + LICENSES/,
  no per-file headers) and Conventional-Commit PR titles.
- rust.yml (src-tauri changes + weekly): rustfmt, clippy -D warnings,
  cargo test, and cargo-deny for RustSec advisories, licenses and sources.
- ci.yml `check` gains: coverage thresholds (src/engine, worker),
  check:licenses, check:bundle, and a `wrangler deploy --dry-run`.

Licensing
- THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md is now generated from package.json, the installed
  packages and Cargo.toml/Cargo.lock (`npm run generate:third-party`); CI
  fails when it is stale or when anything bundled into the app carries a
  license outside the allowlist. It had drifted to React 18 / Vite 7 /
  Tailwind 3.
- Vite's build.license emits the full text of every bundled package's
  license to /licenses/third-party.md (served publicly, before the gate).

Bundle budget
- scripts/check-bundle-size.ts measures what CLAUDE.md's "500KB" never
  defined: initial load (everything index.html references) <= 280 KB gzip
  (197 KB today) and no JS chunk over 500 KB raw.

Coverage
- @vitest/coverage-v8; thresholds sit just under today's numbers. The
  engine is at 89% lines / 64% functions — not the 100% CLAUDE.md claimed.

Supply chain
- Every third-party action pinned to a commit SHA (Dependabot updates the
  SHA and its version comment); checkout never persists credentials.
- Release workflows: a `verify` job (typecheck, tests, version sync, Tauri
  alignment, tag == package version) gates the build; no dependency caches
  in release jobs; permissions granted per job.
- Reusable Discord workflows receive only the secrets they declare instead
  of `secrets: inherit` (which exposed the Android signing keys to them).
- Rust: cargo-deny found RUSTSEC-2026-0194/0195 (quick-xml DoS, via plist)
  that Dependabot had not raised; plist 1.10 brings quick-xml 0.41.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 19:46:24 +07:00

88 lines
3.0 KiB
YAML

name: Security
on:
pull_request:
branches: [main]
push:
branches: [main]
schedule:
# Mondays 04:17 UTC — new advisories and Scorecard drift surface weekly
# even when nothing is being merged.
- cron: "17 4 * * 1"
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: security-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.ref != 'refs/heads/main' }}
jobs:
# Blocks a PR that ADDS a dependency with a known high/critical advisory.
# Licenses are checked by `npm run check:licenses` (ci.yml) instead: the
# dependency graph's license data is patchy for npm and would flag noise.
dependency-review:
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/dependency-review-action@a1d282b36b6f3519aa1f3fc636f609c47dddb294 # v5.0.0
with:
fail-on-severity: high
license-check: false
# Lint the workflows themselves: syntax/expressions (actionlint) and
# security smells — template injection, over-broad permissions, credential
# persistence, unpinned actions (zizmor, config in .github/zizmor.yml).
workflow-lint:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: actionlint
uses: docker://rhysd/actionlint:1.7.12
with:
args: -color
- name: zizmor
uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@cc914d7f3750a2d13d75c7f184a1060aa0e9d482 # v0.6.4
with:
# Report in the log and fail the job; no SARIF upload, so findings
# are fixed in the PR instead of piling up as code-scanning alerts.
advanced-security: false
min-severity: medium
# OpenSSF Scorecard: supply-chain posture (pinned deps, token permissions,
# branch protection …). Informational — results go to the job summary and
# scorecard.dev, not to code scanning.
scorecard:
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # publish_results: signs the result for scorecard.dev
actions: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: ossf/scorecard-action@2d1146689b8cda280b9bc96326124645441f03bc # v2.4.4
with:
results_file: scorecard.json
results_format: json
publish_results: true
- name: Summarise
run: |
{
echo "### OpenSSF Scorecard"
echo
echo "| Check | Score |"
echo "| --- | --- |"
jq -r '.checks[] | "| \(.name) | \(.score) |"' scorecard.json
echo
echo "Aggregate: **$(jq -r '.score' scorecard.json) / 10**"
} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"