* docs: maintenance mode — policy, triage bot, issue forms, status badge, docs for 2.3.0 From v2.3.0 the project takes no new features (CONTRIBUTING.md, in Vietnamese and English). Accepted: scheduled dependency updates; security fixes (High/Critical advisories, runtime vulnerabilities); major language/runtime/framework upgrades; bug fixes including UI/UX and accessibility; language fixes. - .github/workflows/triage.yml + scripts/triage.mjs (unit-tested): an issue or pull request whose title or label asks for a feature is labelled enhancement + out-of-scope, answered in both languages and closed (issues as "not planned"). The owner's items, bots, `maintenance-exception` and anything the owner does are left alone. It runs on pull_request_target but checks out only that one script from the default branch, never a pull request's code; workflow_dispatch is a dry run. - Issue forms: blank issues off, questions and ideas to Discussions, security to the private policy; a new language-problem form; the bug form no longer claims the site's report button fills it (those reports go to a private repository). The pull request template asks which of the five kinds of change it is. - README: a maintenance-mode badge and a Status section; the admin paragraph describes auto-publish. SECURITY.md: High/Critical fixes ship out of schedule; the age-check answer is local storage only. - Docs: decisions D21–D24, maintenance policy and cadence (17 §0, QODANA_TOKEN rotation), roadmap frozen, CI (Qodana, whole-tree licences, triage, merge rules), architecture tree, the Workers Builds deploy command, licence notes without the stale license-checker/GSAP lines. - CHANGELOG [2.3.0]; sonar.projectVersion 2.3.0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: link #138 in the 2.3.0 changelog Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: album labels come from both language entries Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): triage without a checkout, and linear title patterns SonarCloud and Qodana on #139: - githubactions:S7631 flags any checkout in a pull_request_target workflow, even of the default branch. The workflow now reads scripts/triage.mjs from the default branch through the API and imports it from a data: URL — nothing is checked out at all. - javascript:S8786: `\s+a?\s*` let two quantifiers compete for the same spaces. The title is trimmed once and the patterns are written so no two quantifiers overlap. - Qodana RegExpRedundantEscape: the bot check is `endsWith("[bot]")`, no regex. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Security Policy
Reporting a vulnerability
Email security@poli0981.dev. Please include steps to reproduce and the affected URL. Do not open a public issue for a security problem.
Expect an acknowledgement within 7 days. This is a personal site maintained by one person, in their spare time — there is no bug bounty and no payout.
Machine-readable contact: https://poli0981.dev/.well-known/security.txt (RFC 9116).
Scope
In scope
poli0981.dev, including its/api/*endpoints,/media/*and/ext-img/*admin.poli0981.dev— anything that reaches the admin or its API without passing Cloudflare Access, the Worker's own Access JWT check or the email allowlist, or that lets an admin page run attacker-controlled script- The Turnstile bot gate in front of the pages (a way to see page content without a pass)
- The widgets cron worker and this repository's build, CI and deploy pipeline
Out of scope
- Findings that require an already-compromised Cloudflare, GitHub or Access identity
- Attacks on Cloudflare Access's own login flow (report those to Cloudflare)
- Volumetric denial of service
- Missing hardening headers with no demonstrated impact
- Reports that are only raw automated-scanner output, with no working proof of concept
- Anything about the third-party services the site links out to (YouTube, Steam, Discord…)
Supported versions
Only the currently deployed site (main → Cloudflare Workers) is supported. Releases are
tagged (v2.0.0 onwards, see CHANGELOG.md) for reference only — there are
no backports. https://poli0981.dev/api/health reports the version and commit that is live.
The project is in maintenance mode (CONTRIBUTING.md), and security work
is the first thing it keeps doing: a dependency advisory of High or Critical severity, or a
serious vulnerability in Node.js or the Workers runtime, is fixed and deployed as soon as
possible, outside the regular update schedule.
What the site actually handles
Useful context when judging impact — the site is static and stores almost nothing:
- No visitor accounts or logins, no ad or analytics trackers. The only cookie is
__Host-gate, a signed 48-hour pass set after the Turnstile bot check (expiry, random value and HMAC — no identifier; seesrc/lib/gate/). Preferences, and the answer to the age check on age-rated pages (an age threshold, never a birth date), stay in the browser'slocalStorageand are never sent to the site. - User-submitted input: the bug-report form (Turnstile-gated, schema-validated, size-capped,
forwarded to an issue in a private repository and a Discord webhook) and the bot-check
token exchange at
/api/gate. Both are rate-limited per client. - IP addresses are used transiently for rate limiting and the IP denylist; they are not stored with reports. Workers Logs keep request logs for 7 days.
- The admin is single-owner: Cloudflare Access in front, plus the Worker verifying the Access JWT, a 24-hour token age and an email allowlist on every request; every action is written to an audit log.
The hardening in place is described in
poli0981.dev-docs/06_SECURITY.md, and the privacy
statement at /legal/privacy.