SP-4's exit criterion was "command line + JSON fixture pinned". The command line was pinned in prose in Phase 0; the fixture never was, so every claim about pip-audit's output in PRD, SECURITY and CODE-HEALTH-SPEC has been unchecked since. It is captured now, from the pinned 2.10.1 against the spike's own `urllib3==2.0.0` environment, and `crates/pipdock-core/src/audit.rs` is written against it rather than against the documents. Four things running it settled, none of which reading could: - **No severity exists, under either service.** The vuln object is exactly `id`, `fix_versions`, `aliases`, `description`; pip-audit's service model has no severity field at all. PRD P1-1's "severity-sorted" and SECURITY §6's "(CVE/GHSA id, severity, fixed-in)" were both written against a field that has never existed. The next commit corrects them; `sort_advisories` orders by package, then by whether anything *fixes* it, then by id — the one distinction that changes what a user can do. Deriving a severity from the id's year or the prose would be a number PipDock invented, shown beside real ones. - **The ids are `PYSEC-*`, so the default service is PyPI**, and the CVE is an alias. Leaving that default is what keeps `legal/PRIVACY-POLICY.md` §3's "exactly one destination" true — and it costs nothing: the same environment under `--vulnerability-service osv` returns the *same eight advisories*, set difference empty in both directions. - **Ids repeat**, so dedup is load-bearing rather than tidy. Ten rows for eight advisories under PyPI; sixteen for the same eight under OSV. Keyed on `(pkg, id)`, because one advisory can legitimately apply to two installed packages. - **stderr carries a `pip-compile` advisory on every run**, so stdout is parsed first and failure classified only if that fails — SP-1's rule for uv, which writes its plan to stderr for the same reason. `advisory_url` builds the OSV link from a **validated** id rather than taking a URL out of the tool's JSON. That is the difference between this and `PdHealthReport`'s `finding.url`, which `capabilities/external-links.json` calls out as the only URL in the application derived from a third party's output: a whitelist of ASCII alphanumerics and `-` cannot produce a `/`, `?`, `#`, `:` or `%`, so nothing that passes can be anything but a path segment under one host. Ten hostile ids are asserted to get no link at all. No wire registration yet — the types derive `JsonSchema` but stay out of `SCHEMA_TYPES` until a command returns one, exactly as P2 held `ToolsManifest` back until P3 had a use for it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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WARNING:pip_audit._cli:--no-deps is supported, but users are encouraged to fully hash their pinned dependencies
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WARNING:pip_audit._cli:Consider using a tool like `pip-compile`: https://pip-tools.readthedocs.io/en/latest/#using-hashes
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Found 10 known vulnerabilities in 1 package
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