SP-4's exit criterion was "command line + JSON fixture pinned". The command line was pinned in prose in Phase 0; the fixture never was, so every claim about pip-audit's output in PRD, SECURITY and CODE-HEALTH-SPEC has been unchecked since. It is captured now, from the pinned 2.10.1 against the spike's own `urllib3==2.0.0` environment, and `crates/pipdock-core/src/audit.rs` is written against it rather than against the documents. Four things running it settled, none of which reading could: - **No severity exists, under either service.** The vuln object is exactly `id`, `fix_versions`, `aliases`, `description`; pip-audit's service model has no severity field at all. PRD P1-1's "severity-sorted" and SECURITY §6's "(CVE/GHSA id, severity, fixed-in)" were both written against a field that has never existed. The next commit corrects them; `sort_advisories` orders by package, then by whether anything *fixes* it, then by id — the one distinction that changes what a user can do. Deriving a severity from the id's year or the prose would be a number PipDock invented, shown beside real ones. - **The ids are `PYSEC-*`, so the default service is PyPI**, and the CVE is an alias. Leaving that default is what keeps `legal/PRIVACY-POLICY.md` §3's "exactly one destination" true — and it costs nothing: the same environment under `--vulnerability-service osv` returns the *same eight advisories*, set difference empty in both directions. - **Ids repeat**, so dedup is load-bearing rather than tidy. Ten rows for eight advisories under PyPI; sixteen for the same eight under OSV. Keyed on `(pkg, id)`, because one advisory can legitimately apply to two installed packages. - **stderr carries a `pip-compile` advisory on every run**, so stdout is parsed first and failure classified only if that fails — SP-1's rule for uv, which writes its plan to stderr for the same reason. `advisory_url` builds the OSV link from a **validated** id rather than taking a URL out of the tool's JSON. That is the difference between this and `PdHealthReport`'s `finding.url`, which `capabilities/external-links.json` calls out as the only URL in the application derived from a third party's output: a whitelist of ASCII alphanumerics and `-` cannot produce a `/`, `?`, `#`, `:` or `%`, so nothing that passes can be anything but a path segment under one host. Ten hostile ids are asserted to get no link at all. No wire registration yet — the types derive `JsonSchema` but stay out of `SCHEMA_TYPES` until a command returns one, exactly as P2 held `ToolsManifest` back until P3 had a use for it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2 lines
15 KiB
JSON
2 lines
15 KiB
JSON
{"dependencies": [{"name": "urllib3", "version": "2.0.0", "vulns": [{"id": "PYSEC-2023-192", "fix_versions": ["1.26.17", "2.0.6"], "aliases": ["CVE-2023-43804", "GHSA-v845-jxx5-vc9f"], "description": "urllib3 doesn't treat the `Cookie` HTTP header special or provide any helpers for managing cookies over HTTP, that is the responsibility of the user. However, it is possible for a user to specify a `Cookie` header and unknowingly leak information via HTTP redirects to a different origin if that user doesn't disable redirects explicitly. Users **must** handle redirects themselves instead of relying on urllib3's automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the `Cookie` header, thus we decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach. ## Affected usages We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited: * Using an affected version of urllib3 (patched in v1.26.17 and v2.0.6) * Using the `Cookie` header on requests, which is mostly typical for impersonating a browser. * Not disabling HTTP redirects * Either not using HTTPS or for the origin server to redirect to a malicious origin. ## Remediation * Upgrading to at least urllib3 v1.26.17 or v2.0.6 * Disabling HTTP redirects using `redirects=False` when sending requests. * Not using the `Cookie` header."}, {"id": "PYSEC-2023-192", "fix_versions": ["1.26.17", "2.0.6"], "aliases": ["CVE-2023-43804", "GHSA-v845-jxx5-vc9f"], "description": "urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. urllib3 doesn't treat the `Cookie` HTTP header special or provide any helpers for managing cookies over HTTP, that is the responsibility of the user. However, it is possible for a user to specify a `Cookie` header and unknowingly leak information via HTTP redirects to a different origin if that user doesn't disable redirects explicitly. This issue has been patched in urllib3 version 1.26.17 or 2.0.5."}, {"id": "PYSEC-2023-212", "fix_versions": ["1.26.18", "2.0.7"], "aliases": ["CVE-2023-45803", "GHSA-g4mx-q9vg-27p4"], "description": "urllib3 previously wouldn't remove the HTTP request body when an HTTP redirect response using status 303 \"See Other\" after the request had its method changed from one that could accept a request body (like `POST`) to `GET` as is required by HTTP RFCs. Although the behavior of removing the request body is not specified in the section for redirects, it can be inferred by piecing together information from different sections and we have observed the behavior in other major HTTP client implementations like curl and web browsers. From [RFC 9110 Section 9.3.1](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110.html#name-get): > A client SHOULD NOT generate content in a GET request unless it is made directly to an origin server that has previously indicated, in or out of band, that such a request has a purpose and will be adequately supported. ## Affected usages Because the vulnerability requires a previously trusted service to become compromised in order to have an impact on confidentiality we believe the exploitability of this vulnerability is low. Additionally, many users aren't putting sensitive data in HTTP request bodies, if this is the case then this vulnerability isn't exploitable. Both of the following conditions must be true to be affected by this vulnerability: * If you're using urllib3 and submitting sensitive information in the HTTP request body (such as form data or JSON) * The origin service is compromised and starts redirecting using 303 to a malicious peer or the redirected-to service becomes compromised. ## Remediation You can remediate this vulnerability with any of the following steps: * Upgrade to a patched version of urllib3 (v1.26.18 or v2.0.7) * Disable redirects for services that you aren't expecting to respond with redirects with `redirects=False`. * Disable automatic redirects with `redirects=False` and handle 303 redirects manually by stripping the HTTP request body."}, {"id": "PYSEC-2023-212", "fix_versions": ["1.26.18", "2.0.7"], "aliases": ["CVE-2023-45803", "GHSA-g4mx-q9vg-27p4"], "description": "urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. urllib3 previously wouldn't remove the HTTP request body when an HTTP redirect response using status 301, 302, or 303 after the request had its method changed from one that could accept a request body (like `POST`) to `GET` as is required by HTTP RFCs. Although this behavior is not specified in the section for redirects, it can be inferred by piecing together information from different sections and we have observed the behavior in other major HTTP client implementations like curl and web browsers. Because the vulnerability requires a previously trusted service to become compromised in order to have an impact on confidentiality we believe the exploitability of this vulnerability is low. Additionally, many users aren't putting sensitive data in HTTP request bodies, if this is the case then this vulnerability isn't exploitable. Both of the following conditions must be true to be affected by this vulnerability: 1. Using urllib3 and submitting sensitive information in the HTTP request body (such as form data or JSON) and 2. The origin service is compromised and starts redirecting using 301, 302, or 303 to a malicious peer or the redirected-to service becomes compromised. This issue has been addressed in versions 1.26.18 and 2.0.7 and users are advised to update to resolve this issue. Users unable to update should disable redirects for services that aren't expecting to respond with redirects with `redirects=False` and disable automatic redirects with `redirects=False` and handle 301, 302, and 303 redirects manually by stripping the HTTP request body. "}, {"id": "PYSEC-2026-141", "fix_versions": ["2.7.0"], "aliases": ["GHSA-qccp-gfcp-xxvc", "CVE-2026-44431"], "description": "urllib3 is an HTTP client library for Python. From 1.23 to before 2.7.0, cross-origin redirects followed from the low-level API via ProxyManager.connection_from_url().urlopen(..., assert_same_host=False) still forward these sensitive headers. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.7.0."}, {"id": "PYSEC-2026-1999", "fix_versions": ["2.5.0"], "aliases": ["GHSA-pq67-6m6q-mj2v", "CVE-2025-50181"], "description": "urllib3 handles redirects and retries using the same mechanism, which is controlled by the `Retry` object. The most common way to disable redirects is at the request level, as follows: ```python resp = urllib3.request(\"GET\", \"https://httpbin.org/redirect/1\", redirect=False) print(resp.status) # 302 ``` However, it is also possible to disable redirects, for all requests, by instantiating a `PoolManager` and specifying `retries` in a way that disable redirects: ```python import urllib3 http = urllib3.PoolManager(retries=0) # should raise MaxRetryError on redirect http = urllib3.PoolManager(retries=urllib3.Retry(redirect=0)) # equivalent to the above http = urllib3.PoolManager(retries=False) # should return the first response resp = http.request(\"GET\", \"https://httpbin.org/redirect/1\") ``` However, the `retries` parameter is currently ignored, which means all the above examples don't disable redirects. ## Affected usages Passing `retries` on `PoolManager` instantiation to disable redirects or restrict their number. By default, requests and botocore users are not affected. ## Impact Redirects are often used to exploit SSRF vulnerabilities. An application attempting to mitigate SSRF or open redirect vulnerabilities by disabling redirects at the PoolManager level will remain vulnerable. ## Remediation You can remediate this vulnerability with the following steps: * Upgrade to a patched version of urllib3. If your organization would benefit from the continued support of urllib3 1.x, please contact [sethmichaellarson@gmail.com](mailto:sethmichaellarson@gmail.com) to discuss sponsorship or contribution opportunities. * Disable redirects at the `request()` level instead of the `PoolManager()` level."}, {"id": "PYSEC-2026-1998", "fix_versions": ["2.6.0"], "aliases": ["CVE-2025-66418", "GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53"], "description": "## Impact urllib3 supports chained HTTP encoding algorithms for response content according to RFC 9110 (e.g., `Content-Encoding: gzip, zstd`). However, the number of links in the decompression chain was unbounded allowing a malicious server to insert a virtually unlimited number of compression steps leading to high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data. ## Affected usages Applications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.5.0 and earlier for HTTP requests to untrusted sources unless they disable content decoding explicitly. ## Remediation Upgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.0 in which the library limits the number of links to 5. If upgrading is not immediately possible, use [`preload_content=False`](https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/2.5.0/advanced-usage.html#streaming-and-i-o) and ensure that `resp.headers[\"content-encoding\"]` contains a safe number of encodings before reading the response content."}, {"id": "PYSEC-2026-1995", "fix_versions": ["1.26.19", "2.2.2"], "aliases": ["CVE-2024-37891", "GHSA-34jh-p97f-mpxf"], "description": "When using urllib3's proxy support with `ProxyManager`, the `Proxy-Authorization` header is only sent to the configured proxy, as expected. However, when sending HTTP requests *without* using urllib3's proxy support, it's possible to accidentally configure the `Proxy-Authorization` header even though it won't have any effect as the request is not using a forwarding proxy or a tunneling proxy. In those cases, urllib3 doesn't treat the `Proxy-Authorization` HTTP header as one carrying authentication material and thus doesn't strip the header on cross-origin redirects. Because this is a highly unlikely scenario, we believe the severity of this vulnerability is low for almost all users. Out of an abundance of caution urllib3 will automatically strip the `Proxy-Authorization` header during cross-origin redirects to avoid the small chance that users are doing this on accident. Users should use urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the `Proxy-Authorization` header, but we still decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach. ## Affected usages We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited: * Setting the `Proxy-Authorization` header without using urllib3's built-in proxy support. * Not disabling HTTP redirects. * Either not using an HTTPS origin server or for the proxy or target origin to redirect to a malicious origin. ## Remediation * Using the `Proxy-Authorization` header with urllib3's `ProxyManager`. * Disabling HTTP redirects using `redirects=False` when sending requests. * Not using the `Proxy-Authorization` header."}, {"id": "PYSEC-2026-1994", "fix_versions": ["2.6.0"], "aliases": ["CVE-2025-66471", "GHSA-2xpw-w6gg-jr37"], "description": "### Impact urllib3's [streaming API](https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/2.5.0/advanced-usage.html#streaming-and-i-o) is designed for the efficient handling of large HTTP responses by reading the content in chunks, rather than loading the entire response body into memory at once. When streaming a compressed response, urllib3 can perform decoding or decompression based on the HTTP `Content-Encoding` header (e.g., `gzip`, `deflate`, `br`, or `zstd`). The library must read compressed data from the network and decompress it until the requested chunk size is met. Any resulting decompressed data that exceeds the requested amount is held in an internal buffer for the next read operation. The decompression logic could cause urllib3 to fully decode a small amount of highly compressed data in a single operation. This can result in excessive resource consumption (high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data; CWE-409) on the client side, even if the application only requested a small chunk of data. ### Affected usages Applications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.5.0 and earlier to stream large compressed responses or content from untrusted sources. `stream()`, `read(amt=256)`, `read1(amt=256)`, `read_chunked(amt=256)`, `readinto(b)` are examples of `urllib3.HTTPResponse` method calls using the affected logic unless decoding is disabled explicitly. ### Remediation Upgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.0 in which the library avoids decompressing data that exceeds the requested amount. If your environment contains a package facilitating the Brotli encoding, upgrade to at least Brotli 1.2.0 or brotlicffi 1.2.0.0 too. These versions are enforced by the `urllib3[brotli]` extra in the patched versions of urllib3. ### Credits The issue was reported by @Cycloctane. Supplemental information was provided by @stamparm during a security audit performed by [7ASecurity](https://7asecurity.com/) and facilitated by [OSTIF](https://ostif.org/)."}, {"id": "PYSEC-2026-1996", "fix_versions": ["2.6.3"], "aliases": ["GHSA-38jv-5279-wg99", "CVE-2026-21441"], "description": "### Impact urllib3's [streaming API](https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/2.6.2/advanced-usage.html#streaming-and-i-o) is designed for the efficient handling of large HTTP responses by reading the content in chunks, rather than loading the entire response body into memory at once. urllib3 can perform decoding or decompression based on the HTTP `Content-Encoding` header (e.g., `gzip`, `deflate`, `br`, or `zstd`). When using the streaming API, the library decompresses only the necessary bytes, enabling partial content consumption. However, for HTTP redirect responses, the library would read the entire response body to drain the connection and decompress the content unnecessarily. This decompression occurred even before any read methods were called, and configured read limits did not restrict the amount of decompressed data. As a result, there was no safeguard against decompression bombs. A malicious server could exploit this to trigger excessive resource consumption on the client (high CPU usage and large memory allocations for decompressed data; CWE-409). ### Affected usages Applications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.6.2 and earlier to stream content from untrusted sources by setting `preload_content=False` when they do not disable redirects. ### Remediation Upgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.3 in which the library does not decode content of redirect responses when `preload_content=False`. If upgrading is not immediately possible, disable [redirects](https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/2.6.2/user-guide.html#retrying-requests) by setting `redirect=False` for requests to untrusted source."}]}], "fixes": []}
|