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poli0981andClaude Opus 5.5 999d0887ee Fix the SonarQube Cloud findings; release 4.4.2 (#155)
The first SonarQube Cloud scan reported 57 issues. 45 are fixed in code, the 11 on the saved itch.io test pages leave the scan via .sonarcloud.properties, and css:S8776 (Tailwind's @utility nesting) is a false positive to mark on SonarQube Cloud.

Worker: trailing slashes and the gate cookie's padding are trimmed by trimEnd() instead of /\/+$/ (quadratic on the public 404 path); the feed and collection parsers lose their backtracking regexes; compareCodeUnits keeps the code-unit sorts (the rule's localeCompare is locale-dependent); Number.*, DEFAULT_SIZES, crypto.randomUUID; i18n-edit.mjs reads stdin. Pipeline: the NSFW notices are one selector list, either class (the rule's ".a.b" would need both), each tested; plain if-guards; update_info.main returns None; no plain-http adapter; [[ ]] in cf_build_status.sh.

Supply chain: requirements*.txt are hash-locked pip-tools compiles of requirements*.in (on Python 3.14, which Dependabot reads from the header), installed with --require-hashes --only-binary :all: in block scalars; npm ci --ignore-scripts in CI and the release builds (verified by manual release runs on all platforms); npm run cf:check.

Release 4.4.2: also ships the toolchain upgrade (#149, #154) and Dependabot #141-#148, #150, #152, #153. CLAUDE.md gotchas 40 and 41.

[skip-discuss]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 18:16:12 +07:00

70 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Cloudflare Access verification for /admin and /api/admin/* (maintainer).
*
* Access sits in front of those paths, but a Worker with static assets does
* not receive `ctx.access`, and requests that bypass the zone (workers.dev,
* previews — both disabled in wrangler.jsonc) would skip Access entirely.
* So every protected request re-verifies the `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion` JWT
* here: signature against the team's JWKS, issuer, and the application's AUD.
*/
import { createRemoteJWKSet, jwtVerify, type JWTPayload } from 'jose'
import { trimEnd } from './text'
export interface AccessEnv {
ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAIN: string // https://<team>.cloudflareaccess.com
ACCESS_AUD_ADMIN: string
ADMIN_EMAILS: string // comma-separated; a secret, not in the repo
SITE_ORIGIN: string
}
export interface Identity {
kind: 'maintainer'
/** The maintainer's email. */
id: string
}
export class AccessError extends Error {}
const jwksByTeam = new Map<string, ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet>>()
function jwks(teamDomain: string) {
let set = jwksByTeam.get(teamDomain)
if (!set) {
set = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(`${teamDomain}/cdn-cgi/access/certs`))
jwksByTeam.set(teamDomain, set)
}
return set
}
async function verify(request: Request, env: AccessEnv, audience: string): Promise<JWTPayload> {
const token = request.headers.get('cf-access-jwt-assertion')
if (!token) throw new AccessError('missing Access token')
// The issuer is the bare origin; tolerate a trailing slash pasted from the dashboard.
const team = trimEnd(env.ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAIN.trim(), '/')
try {
const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, jwks(team), { issuer: team, audience })
return payload
} catch {
throw new AccessError('invalid Access token')
}
}
const SAFE_METHODS = new Set(['GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS'])
/** The maintainer, signed in through the "Admin" Access application. */
export async function requireMaintainer(request: Request, env: AccessEnv): Promise<Identity> {
const payload = await verify(request, env, env.ACCESS_AUD_ADMIN)
const email = String(payload.email ?? '').toLowerCase()
const allowed = env.ADMIN_EMAILS.toLowerCase()
.split(',')
.map((s) => s.trim())
.filter(Boolean)
if (!email || !allowed.includes(email)) throw new AccessError('not a maintainer')
// Cross-site request forgery guard for writes (the Access cookie is sent
// with top-level cross-site requests too).
if (!SAFE_METHODS.has(request.method) && request.headers.get('origin') !== env.SITE_ORIGIN) {
throw new AccessError('bad origin')
}
return { kind: 'maintainer', id: email }
}