Files
bookmarkmagic/scripts/sanitize-bookmarks.mjs
T
poli0981andClaude Opus 5 cf0435e7b7 fix: close the eighteen findings the Phase 6 review confirmed
Six lenses over the branch, each finding independently attacked by a verifier
told to refute it. 31 filed, 18 survived, clustering into five real defects —
and the pattern held: every one is in work added earlier in this same branch.

**The sanitizer did not keep its promise (9 findings).** It is the single
privacy control in the intake flow, named as mandatory in SECURITY.md, README,
CONTRIBUTING, the privacy policy and the issue form — and it leaked in nine
distinct ways. Worst: `detectKind` fell back to 'csv' for anything it could not
identify, `sanitizeCsv` then matched no columns, and the input was emitted
verbatim with exit code 0. The users who run this tool are by definition the
ones whose file did not import, so a truncated or hand-excerpted file is the
TYPICAL input — and `tests/fixtures/malformed/no-doctype.html`, already in the
repo, reproduced it. The test could not catch any of this: it returned early
whenever the original failed to parse, so it passed vacuously on precisely the
dangerous inputs.

Nine holes found in one pass is not a signal to patch nine holes. The rules are
regexes over untrusted markup, so "we thought of every shape" is not a claim
anyone can make honestly. So the tool now fails safe:

- unidentified input is REFUSED, matching core detectFormat rather than being
  weaker than the parser it fronts;
- the output is checked before it is written — any host that is not one of our
  own `*.example` aliases means a rule missed something, and the file is refused
  with the leaked host named. A rule this misses now degrades into an annoying
  refusal instead of a published browsing history.

The individual holes are fixed too: single-quoted and bare attribute values were
never matched (a straight leak); `spansFrom` located capture groups by searching
the match text, landing on the wrong copy — replaced with the `d` flag's exact
offsets; overlapping spans spliced already-rewritten text using offsets measured
against the original; `[^<]*` made a title containing a raw `<` fail to match
entirely; `<DD>` stopped at the first newline, publishing the rest of a wrapped
note; and replaceSpans rebuilt the whole string per span, O(spans x file).

**The import report pointed users at a backup that was never written.** The
guard was "mode is replace and this is not a BmBackupError", but runImport
resolves the roots BEFORE proving the backup — so NO_WRITABLE_ROOTS, added in
this same branch, reaches the catch with nothing on disk. Now keyed on the
onClearing callback, which is the only signal that proveBackup actually
returned.

**Cancelling a Replace after the clear read as a harmless no-op.** The tree is
gone and only `created` of it rebuilt; "N items created" alone, on a browser
that is now nearly empty, is the wrong story. It now says so and names the
backup.

**Collapsing a folder while a search was active re-opened it instantly.** The
$effect read and wrote the same two `$state` sets, making it its own dependency:
every write re-invalidated it and it re-merged an unchanged `search.expand`.
Reproduced against the real Svelte runtime — `$effect` is stripped under this
repo's vitest config, so no unit test could have seen it. Fixed with `untrack`,
which also removes the self-retrigger loop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 20:02:36 +07:00

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#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* Strip personal data from a bookmark file, keeping the bug.
*
* Purpose: make "attach a sanitized sample" (SECURITY.md, the parser issue
* form) something a reporter can actually do, instead of an instruction they
* have to interpret.
* Inputs: a Netscape HTML, BookmarkMagic JSON, or CSV bookmark file.
* Guarantees: every byte outside a replaced address or title is untouched —
* including the BOM, the doctype, line endings, tag and attribute case,
* quoting style, indentation, and every timestamp. Replacements are stable
* per distinct input value, so "how many distinct hosts" and "which two
* bookmarks are duplicates" survive.
*
* Zero dependencies, Node stdlib only, no network. It has to run from a fresh
* clone with nothing installed, which is also why it re-implements a three-line
* format sniff rather than importing `src/lib/core/detect-format.ts`.
*
* Usage:
* node scripts/sanitize-bookmarks.mjs <input> [output]
* node scripts/sanitize-bookmarks.mjs <input> --stdout
* node scripts/sanitize-bookmarks.mjs <input> --check # report, write nothing
*/
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { basename, extname } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
/** Matches docs/09's parse cap. A 25 MB attachment helps nobody anyway. */
const MAX_BYTES = 25 * 1024 * 1024;
/** 1×1 transparent PNG. Keeps ICON= present, which is what the parser reacts to. */
const BLANK_ICON =
'';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- format sniff
/** The docs/04 §3 CSV header, in order. A file is CSV only if it says so. */
const CSV_HEADER = ['folder_path', 'title', 'url', 'add_date'];
/**
* Identify the format, or refuse.
*
* @param {string} text
* @returns {'html' | 'json' | 'csv' | null} `null` when nothing matched.
*
* Returning `null` rather than guessing is load-bearing. Every sanitizer below
* finds what it must destroy *by format*, so a wrong guess destroys nothing and
* emits the input verbatim — and the file would still be handed to the user as
* "sanitized". The old `return 'csv'` fallback did exactly that for a truncated
* JSON export, an HTML excerpt with no doctype, or a CSV with foreign headers:
* byte-identical output, exit code 0, real hostnames intact.
*
* The people who run this tool are, by definition, the ones whose file did not
* import — so a malformed or hand-trimmed file is the *typical* input here, not
* an edge case. `src/lib/core/detect-format.ts` refuses these same inputs with
* `UNKNOWN_FORMAT`; this must not be weaker than the parser it fronts.
*/
export function detectKind(text) {
const body = text.charCodeAt(0) === 0xfeff ? text.slice(1) : text;
if (/NETSCAPE-Bookmark-file-1/i.test(body.slice(0, 512))) return 'html';
const trimmed = body.trimStart();
if (trimmed.startsWith('{')) {
try {
JSON.parse(trimmed);
return 'json';
} catch {
// Not JSON after all; fall through.
}
}
const firstLine = body.split(/\r?\n/, 1)[0] ?? '';
for (const delimiter of [',', ';']) {
const columns = firstLine
.split(delimiter)
.map((h) => h.trim().replace(/^"|"$/g, '').toLowerCase());
if (columns.length === CSV_HEADER.length && CSV_HEADER.every((c, i) => columns[i] === c)) {
return 'csv';
}
}
if (/<\s*dl[\s>]/i.test(body)) return 'html';
return null;
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------- mappers
/**
* Replace addresses while preserving everything a parser branches on: the
* scheme, whether there is a port, how deep the path is, whether it ends in a
* slash, how many query parameters there are and in what order, and whether
* there is a fragment. Percent-escapes are carried across literally, so a
* decoding bug still reproduces.
*/
function makeUrlMapper() {
const seen = new Map();
const hosts = new Map();
const hostAlias = (host) => {
let alias = hosts.get(host);
if (alias === undefined) {
const n = hosts.size;
// a.example … z.example, then a1.example, a2.example …
const letter = String.fromCharCode(97 + (n % 26));
const round = Math.floor(n / 26);
alias = round === 0 ? `${letter}.example` : `${letter}${round}.example`;
hosts.set(host, alias);
}
return alias;
};
const escapesIn = (segment) => (segment.match(/%[0-9a-fA-F]{2}/g) ?? []).join('');
const mapPath = (pathname) => {
if (pathname === '' || pathname === '/') return pathname;
const trailing = pathname.endsWith('/');
const parts = pathname.replace(/^\//, '').replace(/\/$/, '').split('/');
const mapped = parts.map((p, i) => (p === '' ? '' : `p${i + 1}${escapesIn(p)}`));
return `/${mapped.join('/')}${trailing ? '/' : ''}`;
};
const mapQuery = (search) => {
if (search === '') return '';
return `?${search
.slice(1)
.split('&')
.map((pair, i) => (pair.includes('=') ? `q${i + 1}=v${i + 1}` : `q${i + 1}`))
.join('&')}`;
};
return (raw) => {
if (raw === '') return raw;
const cached = seen.get(raw);
if (cached !== undefined) return cached;
let out;
let url;
try {
url = new URL(raw);
} catch {
url = undefined;
}
if (url === undefined) {
// Keep it unparseable, and keep distinct values distinct — the dedupe
// path treats an unparseable URL as its own trimmed self.
out = `not-a-url-${seen.size + 1}`;
} else if (url.host === '') {
// Opaque scheme (javascript:, data:, mailto:). The scheme is the whole
// point for the T1/T3 threat cases; the payload is not ours to keep.
out = `${url.protocol}sanitized-${seen.size + 1}`;
} else {
// Credentials are never round-tripped, not even as placeholders.
const port = url.port === '' ? '' : `:${url.port}`;
const hash = url.hash === '' ? '' : '#frag';
out = `${url.protocol}//${hostAlias(url.host.replace(/:\d+$/, ''))}${port}${mapPath(url.pathname)}${mapQuery(url.search)}${hash}`;
}
seen.set(raw, out);
return out;
};
}
/**
* Replace titles while preserving what encoding bugs live in: emptiness, the
* scripts present (so a CJK or RTL or emoji bug still reproduces), and any HTML
* entity references, which are carried across verbatim.
*/
function makeTitleMapper() {
const seen = new Map();
const SCRIPTS = [
[/[一-鿿぀-ヿ]/, '文字'],
[/[֐-ࣿ]/, 'شيء'],
[/[\p{Extended_Pictographic}]/u, '🌸'],
];
return (raw) => {
if (raw.trim() === '') return raw;
const cached = seen.get(raw);
if (cached !== undefined) return cached;
const entities = (raw.match(/&(?:#\d+|#x[0-9a-fA-F]+|[a-zA-Z]+);/g) ?? []).join('');
const extras = SCRIPTS.filter(([re]) => re.test(raw))
.map(([, sample]) => sample)
.join('');
const out = `Title ${seen.size + 1}${extras === '' ? '' : ` ${extras}`}${entities}`;
seen.set(raw, out);
return out;
};
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------ span rewriting
/**
* Apply replacements by character span, right to left.
*
* Everything this tool does is expressed as spans so that the bytes between
* them are provably untouched — that is the property the whole exercise rests
* on, and rebuilding the file from a parsed model would quietly lose it.
*
* @param {string} text
* @param {{start: number, end: number, value: string}[]} spans
*/
function replaceSpans(text, spans) {
// Overlaps are dropped, outermost first. Two patterns can legitimately claim
// the same bytes — an <A> title containing `x="http://…"` matches both the
// title rule and the generic attribute sweep — and applying both would splice
// already-rewritten text using an `end` measured against the original,
// silently eating or stranding bytes. The widest span sanitizes the most.
const ordered = [...spans].sort((a, b) => a.start - b.start || b.end - a.end);
const out = [];
let cursor = 0;
for (const span of ordered) {
if (span.start < cursor) continue;
out.push(text.slice(cursor, span.start), span.value);
cursor = span.end;
}
out.push(text.slice(cursor));
// Joined once rather than spliced per span: the old loop rebuilt the whole
// string for every replacement, which is O(spans x file) and takes minutes on
// a large export.
return out.join('');
}
/**
* Collect spans for one capture group of a global regex. `map` receives the
* captured text.
*
* The group's offset is computed by re-scanning the match, so the regex must
* capture a span that appears only once within it — true for every pattern
* here, since each captures an attribute value or an element's text.
*
* @param {string} text
* @param {RegExp} re
* @param {(captured: string) => string} map
* @param {number} [group]
*/
function spansFrom(text, re, map, group = 1) {
// The `d` flag gives exact per-group offsets. The previous version searched
// the match text for the captured substring, which lands on the wrong copy
// whenever the capture also appears earlier in the match — e.g. a bookmark
// whose title equals part of its own URL.
const indexed = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('d') ? re.flags : `${re.flags}d`);
const spans = [];
for (const m of text.matchAll(indexed)) {
const captured = m[group] ?? '';
const at = m.indices?.[group];
if (captured === '' || at === undefined) continue;
spans.push({ start: at[0], end: at[1], value: map(captured) });
}
return spans;
}
/**
* The inside of an opening tag, tolerating `>` within quoted attribute values.
*
* `data:text/html,<h1>hi</h1>` is a legal HREF and appears in the T1/T3
* fixtures. A naive `[^>]*` stops inside it, silently leaving that bookmark's
* title unsanitized — which is the one failure mode this tool must not have.
*/
const TAG_INNARDS = '(?:"[^"]*"|\'[^\']*\'|[^>"\'])*';
// ------------------------------------------------------------------ formats
/**
* Decode an HTML attribute value, then re-encode the result the way the source
* file encoded it.
*
* Netscape exports write `&amp;` inside HREF, but not all of them do, and
* whether a parser unescapes attribute values is itself something people report
* bugs about. Emitting a bare `&` where the source had `&amp;` would silently
* repair the file being reported.
*/
function attrRewriter(map) {
return (captured) => {
const decoded = captured
.replace(/&amp;/gi, '&')
.replace(/&lt;/gi, '<')
.replace(/&gt;/gi, '>')
.replace(/&quot;/gi, '"');
const mapped = map(decoded);
const escapesAmp = /&amp;/i.test(captured) || !captured.includes('&');
return escapesAmp ? mapped.replace(/&/g, '&amp;') : mapped;
};
}
/**
* `name = value`, where the value is double-quoted, single-quoted or bare.
*
* Group 2/3/4 is the value, whichever quoting was used. Matching only `"…"`
* left `HREF='https://…'` completely untouched — real exports in the wild use
* single quotes, and that one is a straight leak.
*/
const ANY_ATTR = /\b([a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*)\s*=\s*(?:"([^"]*)"|'([^']*)'|([^\s"'<>=`]+))/dgi;
/**
* Spans for every attribute whose name matches, at any quoting.
*
* @param {string} text
* @param {RegExp} nameRe tested against the lower-cased attribute name
* @param {(value: string) => string} map
*/
function attrSpans(text, nameRe, map) {
const spans = [];
for (const m of text.matchAll(ANY_ATTR)) {
if (!nameRe.test((m[1] ?? '').toLowerCase())) continue;
const at = m.indices?.[2] ?? m.indices?.[3] ?? m.indices?.[4];
const value = m[2] ?? m[3] ?? m[4] ?? '';
if (at === undefined || value === '') continue;
spans.push({ start: at[0], end: at[1], value: map(value) });
}
return spans;
}
/** Attributes handled explicitly; the generic URL sweep must not touch them. */
const HANDLED_ATTRS = new Set(['href', 'icon']);
/**
* Scrub any *other* attribute whose value is a URL with a host.
*
* Firefox alone writes `ICON_URI`, and `FEEDURL` and friends exist in the wild.
* Enumerating them was already wrong once — `ICON_URI` leaked a real hostname
* through a file that had passed every other check — so this sweeps by value
* shape instead, and covers attributes nobody has thought of yet.
*/
function urlAttrSpans(text, mapUrl) {
const spans = [];
const rewrite = attrRewriter(mapUrl);
for (const m of text.matchAll(ANY_ATTR)) {
const name = (m[1] ?? '').toLowerCase();
const value = m[2] ?? m[3] ?? m[4] ?? '';
if (HANDLED_ATTRS.has(name) || value === '') continue;
try {
if (new URL(value).host === '') continue;
} catch {
continue;
}
const at = m.indices?.[2] ?? m.indices?.[3] ?? m.indices?.[4];
if (at === undefined) continue;
spans.push({ start: at[0], end: at[1], value: rewrite(value) });
}
return spans;
}
function sanitizeHtml(text, mapUrl, mapTitle) {
let descriptions = 0;
let keywords = 0;
const spans = [
// HREF and ICON, at any quoting — attribute name case is left as found.
...attrSpans(text, /^href$/, attrRewriter(mapUrl)),
...attrSpans(text, /^icon$/, () => BLANK_ICON),
...urlAttrSpans(text, mapUrl),
// Firefox keywords and tags are user-authored text, so they are personal
// too. Tag count is preserved because it is the only part a parser sees.
...attrSpans(text, /^shortcuturl$/, () => `kw${++keywords}`),
...attrSpans(text, /^tags$/, (v) =>
v
.split(',')
.map((_, i) => `tag${i + 1}`)
.join(','),
),
// Bookmark titles: the text between <A …> and </A>.
// `[\s\S]*?` and not `[^<]*`: a title containing a raw `<` made the whole
// match fail, so that bookmark's title was left in the output untouched.
...spansFrom(text, new RegExp(`<a\\b${TAG_INNARDS}>([\\s\\S]*?)</a>`, 'gi'), mapTitle),
// Folder titles.
...spansFrom(text, new RegExp(`<h3\\b${TAG_INNARDS}>([\\s\\S]*?)</h3>`, 'gi'), mapTitle),
// Folder/bookmark descriptions.
// Runs to the next element, not to the end of the line: a description that
// wrapped onto a second line left everything after the first newline in
// place, and a `<DD>` is exactly where someone writes a private note.
...spansFrom(
text,
// The `\s*` belongs in the lookahead, not the capture: leaving it inside
// eats the newline and indentation before the next tag, which is exactly
// the byte-level shape this tool promises not to touch.
/<dd>([\s\S]*?)(?=\s*<\s*(?:dt|dd|dl|\/dl)\b|\s*$)/gi,
() => `Description ${++descriptions}`,
),
];
return replaceSpans(text, spans);
}
/**
* Rewrite only the *values* of `url` and `title` string properties, by walking
* the raw text. Parsing and re-stringifying would normalize the indentation and
* line endings, which is exactly what a whitespace-sensitive report needs kept.
*/
function sanitizeJson(text, mapUrl, mapTitle) {
const spans = [];
const re = /"(url|title)"\s*:\s*"((?:[^"\\]|\\.)*)"/g;
for (const m of text.matchAll(re)) {
const key = m[1];
const rawValue = m[2] ?? '';
const start = m.index + m[0].length - 1 - rawValue.length;
let decoded;
try {
decoded = JSON.parse(`"${rawValue}"`);
} catch {
decoded = rawValue;
}
const mapped = key === 'url' ? mapUrl(decoded) : mapTitle(decoded);
spans.push({ start, end: start + rawValue.length, value: JSON.stringify(mapped).slice(1, -1) });
}
return replaceSpans(text, spans);
}
/**
* Walk the CSV with a minimal RFC 4180 reader that records the span of each
* field's *content* (inside the quotes, when quoted). Replacements never
* contain a delimiter, quote or newline, so the original quoting survives
* untouched — which matters, because CSV quoting is itself a common bug.
*/
function sanitizeCsv(text, mapUrl, mapTitle) {
const delimiter = (text.split('\n', 1)[0] ?? '').includes(';') ? ';' : ',';
const fields = [];
let row = 0;
let col = 0;
let i = 0;
while (i < text.length) {
const quoted = text[i] === '"';
if (quoted) i++;
const start = i;
while (i < text.length) {
const ch = text[i];
if (quoted) {
if (ch === '"') {
if (text[i + 1] === '"') {
i += 2;
continue;
}
break;
}
i++;
continue;
}
if (ch === delimiter || ch === '\n' || ch === '\r') break;
i++;
}
fields.push({ row, col, start, end: i, quoted });
if (quoted && text[i] === '"') i++;
if (text[i] === delimiter) {
col++;
i++;
} else {
if (text[i] === '\r') i++;
if (text[i] === '\n') i++;
row++;
col = 0;
}
}
// Column names per docs/04 §3 — `folder_path`, not `folder`.
const header = fields.filter((f) => f.row === 0).map((f) => text.slice(f.start, f.end).trim());
const at = (name) => header.findIndex((h) => h.toLowerCase().replace(/^/, '') === name);
const [folderCol, titleCol, urlCol] = [at('folder_path'), at('title'), at('url')];
const spans = [];
for (const f of fields) {
if (f.row === 0 || f.start === f.end) continue;
const raw = text.slice(f.start, f.end);
const value = raw.replace(/""/g, '"');
let mapped;
if (f.col === urlCol) mapped = mapUrl(value);
else if (f.col === titleCol) mapped = mapTitle(value);
else if (f.col === folderCol) mapped = mapFolderPath(value, mapTitle);
else continue;
spans.push({ start: f.start, end: f.end, value: mapped.replace(/"/g, '""') });
}
return replaceSpans(text, spans);
}
/**
* Map each path segment separately so `\/` and `\\` escapes keep their meaning.
*
* A segment that contained a literal slash or backslash keeps one, so the
* escape survives into the output. Without that, `Escaped\/slash` sanitizes to
* a plain name and the escape branch of the CSV path parser — a real reason
* someone would file a report — stops being exercised by the sample.
*/
function mapFolderPath(path, mapTitle) {
const segments = [];
let current = '';
for (let i = 0; i < path.length; i++) {
const ch = path[i];
if (ch === '\\' && (path[i + 1] === '/' || path[i + 1] === '\\')) {
current += path[i + 1];
i++;
continue;
}
if (ch === '/') {
segments.push(current);
current = '';
continue;
}
current += ch;
}
segments.push(current);
return segments
.map((s) => {
if (s === '') return '';
const kept = `${s.includes('/') ? '/' : ''}${s.includes('\\') ? '\\' : ''}`;
return `${mapTitle(s)}${kept}`.replace(/\\/g, '\\\\').replace(/\//g, '\\/');
})
.join('/');
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------- entry points
/**
* Everything in the OUTPUT that still looks like a real address.
*
* This is the backstop, and it is the only reason the rules above can be
* trusted. They are regexes over untrusted markup, so each one has a shape it
* does not match — a single-quoted attribute, a title containing `<`, a JSON
* key nobody enumerated, a `<DD>` that wraps onto a second line. Every one of
* those is a silent leak, and the only way to find them all by inspection is to
* be sure you have thought of every one, which nobody is.
*
* So instead of trusting the rules, the output is checked: any host that is not
* one of our own `*.example` aliases means something got through, and the file
* is refused rather than handed over. A rule this misses degrades into a
* refusal — annoying — instead of into a published browsing history.
*
* @param {string} text sanitized output
* @returns {string[]} distinct suspicious hosts, empty when clean
*/
export function findLeakedHosts(text) {
const leaked = new Set();
for (const m of text.matchAll(/\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\/([^\s"'<>)\]}\\]+)/gi)) {
const authority = (m[1] ?? '').split(/[/?#]/, 1)[0] ?? '';
// Strip credentials and port; what remains is the host.
const host = authority.split('@').pop()?.replace(/:\d+$/, '').toLowerCase() ?? '';
if (host === '' || /^[a-z]\d*\.example$/.test(host)) continue;
leaked.add(host);
}
return [...leaked];
}
/**
* Sanitize a bookmark file's text.
*
* @param {string} text
* @returns {{ text: string | null, kind: 'html' | 'json' | 'csv' | null, leaked: string[] }}
* `text` is null when the format was not recognised, or when the output
* failed its own leak check. Both mean: write nothing.
*/
export function sanitize(text) {
const kind = detectKind(text);
if (kind === null) return { text: null, kind: null, leaked: [] };
const mapUrl = makeUrlMapper();
const mapTitle = makeTitleMapper();
const out =
kind === 'html'
? sanitizeHtml(text, mapUrl, mapTitle)
: kind === 'json'
? sanitizeJson(text, mapUrl, mapTitle)
: sanitizeCsv(text, mapUrl, mapTitle);
const leaked = findLeakedHosts(out);
return { text: leaked.length > 0 ? null : out, kind, leaked };
}
function main(argv) {
const flags = argv.filter((a) => a.startsWith('--'));
const [input, maybeOutput] = argv.filter((a) => !a.startsWith('--'));
if (input === undefined) {
console.error('usage: node scripts/sanitize-bookmarks.mjs <input> [output] [--stdout|--check]');
return 1;
}
const raw = readFileSync(input);
if (raw.byteLength > MAX_BYTES) {
console.error(
`${input} is ${(raw.byteLength / 1024 / 1024).toFixed(1)} MB. The extension itself refuses ` +
'anything over 25 MB, and a smaller file that still reproduces the bug is more useful. ' +
'Please trim it first.',
);
return 1;
}
const text = raw.toString('utf8');
const { text: out, kind, leaked } = sanitize(text);
if (kind === null) {
console.error(
`${basename(input)} is not a bookmark file this tool recognises, so NOTHING WAS WRITTEN.\n` +
' Expected: a Netscape HTML export (the usual bookmarks.html), a BookmarkMagic JSON\n' +
' export, or a CSV whose header is exactly "folder_path,title,url,add_date".\n' +
' Refusing to hand you a file it cannot promise is clean. Please attach the export\n' +
' exactly as your browser wrote it, or describe the problem in the issue instead.',
);
return 1;
}
if (out === null) {
console.error(
`${basename(input)}: NOTHING WAS WRITTEN — the result still contained ${leaked.length} real ` +
`address(es), so this file is not safe to attach.\n Leaked: ${leaked.slice(0, 5).join(', ')}` +
`${leaked.length > 5 ? `, and ${leaked.length - 5} more` : ''}\n` +
' This is a bug in the sanitizer, not in your file. Please report it (without the file)\n' +
' at https://github.com/poli0981/bookmarkmagic/issues — the address above is enough.',
);
return 1;
}
const eol = text.includes('\r\n') ? 'CRLF' : 'LF';
const bom = text.charCodeAt(0) === 0xfeff ? ', BOM' : '';
console.error(`${basename(input)}: ${kind}, ${eol}${bom} — ${out.length} bytes out, no leaks`);
if (flags.includes('--check')) return 0;
if (flags.includes('--stdout')) {
process.stdout.write(out);
return 0;
}
const ext = extname(input);
const target = maybeOutput ?? `${input.slice(0, input.length - ext.length)}.sanitized${ext}`;
writeFileSync(target, out);
console.error(`wrote ${target}`);
return 0;
}
if (process.argv[1] !== undefined && process.argv[1] === fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)) {
process.exitCode = main(process.argv.slice(2));
}