Five lenses filed 20; 8 survived verification.
**release.yml would have failed on the first tag.** The `announce` job called
the ops reusable with no `with:` block, but that reusable resolves
TAG="${INPUT_TAG:-$EVENT_TAG}" where EVENT_TAG is github.event.release.tag_name
-- empty, because this workflow is triggered by `on: push: tags`, not
`on: release`. The job would have exited 1 on "No release tag available" for
every release. Filed independently by three lenses and confirmed against the
reusable's actual source; docs/12 §2.3 had the same omission and is fixed too.
Ironically the comment right above it explains why the workflow deliberately is
not event-driven -- which is exactly what makes tag_override mandatory.
**Nothing checked the BUILT manifest.** The unit test reads wxt.config.ts,
which proves what we ask for, not what WXT emits. Those differ: a dev build of
this same config carries ["bookmarks","storage","tabs","scripting"] and
host_permissions ["http://localhost/*"]. Production is clean, but that is
WXT's behaviour, not ours. scripts/check-manifest.mjs now gates the artifact
and runs in both CI and release; verified by editing a built manifest. The
README sentence claiming a test asserted the built manifest was false and is
corrected -- the same overclaim I had already made once verbally.
**The contrast test I added last commit could not see its own bypass.**
TabBar's `.locked { opacity: 0.65 }` composites --fg-muted against the page and
drops the label to 2.83:1. The test reads token values, so alpha applied on top
is invisible to it. Opacity removed; the padlock and title already carried the
signal. TEXT_PAIRS also widened to check the status colours on --bg, not only
--bg-raised.
**docs/09 T3 was signed off with half its mitigation unbuilt.** The row has
always specified a ⚠ badge for dangerous schemes; only the blocking existed. A
`javascript:` bookmark titled "Your bank" rendered identically to a safe one
and its Open button silently did nothing. isBlockedUrl now drives a badge, and
a refused open raises a toast.
Also: the five row action buttons had glyphs as their accessible names (content
beats title in accname), so voice control could not address them; the manifest
test's literal-harvesting regex would have passed a spread or identifier;
resolveNewFolderParent returned a focused unmodifiable folder's id, which every
create rejects; and clipboard.ts was the only new module with no test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
10 KiB
12 — CI/CD
Integrates with the centralized ops repo poli0981/.github, whose reusable
workflows use the reusable-* naming family. There is no
browser-extension-* family — the single Chrome-extension workflow is
reusable-chrome-extension.yml.
1. Known constraints (from the ops-repo migration)
poli0981is a user account → no org-level secrets; repo-level Actions secrets only.- Caller stubs MUST declare explicit
permissions:blocks — reusable workflows do not inherit them (bug already burned once; never omit). - New repo joins in side-by-side mode is unnecessary (greenfield) — adopt the centralized workflows directly from day one.
reusable-chrome-extension.ymlruns no quality gates. Its completeworkflow_callsurface is inputspackage-manager(default'none'),node-version('24'),build-command('npm run build'),source-dir('.'),release(false) — and nosecrets:block at all, so passing any named secret to it is a workflow-compile error. It installs, builds, assertsmanifest_version == 3,zip -rqssource-dirand uploads an artifact. Lint, type-check, knip, tests, coverage and the grep gates are the caller's job (§2.1).- Sibling precedent for the same stack is
poli0981/switch-every-tab-hotkey, which currently keeps its CI self-contained rather than calling the ops reusables. Do not assume its workflows are a drop-in template.
2. Workflows (caller stubs in this repo)
2.1 .github/workflows/ci.yml — every push/PR to main
The local quality job exists because the ops reusable workflow performs none
of it (§1). The build job delegates packaging.
name: CI
on:
push: { branches: [main] }
pull_request:
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: ci-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
jobs:
quality:
name: Quality gates
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with: { node-version: '24', cache: npm }
- run: npm ci
- run: npm run lint # biome check .
- run: npm run check # svelte-check + tsc --noEmit
- run: npm run knip
- run: npm run coverage # vitest --coverage, thresholds per 11 §1
- run: npm run guard # canonical grep gate, 08_MV3 §3
- run: npm run build
- run: npm run check:manifest # the BUILT artifact, not just the config
build:
name: Build + package
needs: quality
uses: poli0981/.github/.github/workflows/reusable-chrome-extension.yml@main
permissions:
contents: read
with:
package-manager: 'npm' # 01 §6 commits package-lock.json
node-version: '24'
build-command: 'npm run build'
source-dir: '.output/chrome-mv3' # WXT emits the manifest here
release: false
All four with: values are required. Omitting package-manager defaults it to
'none', which skips install/build entirely and then fails on
test -f ./manifest.json — a file WXT never writes to the repo root.
npm run guard runs the same script locally and in CI, so the gate cannot
drift between the two (10 §3). It is the single canonical pattern defined in
08_MV3_COMPLIANCE.md §3; do not restate the pattern here or anywhere else.
2.2 .github/workflows/codeql.yml
Use the current reusable (reusable-codeql.yml, CodeQL Action v4). Its input is
languages — a JSON array encoded as a string, not the singular language
of the older codeql.yml.
name: CodeQL
on:
push: { branches: [main] }
pull_request: { branches: [main] }
schedule:
- cron: '0 14 * * 1' # weekly, Monday
permissions:
security-events: write
actions: read
contents: read
packages: read
jobs:
analyze:
uses: poli0981/.github/.github/workflows/reusable-codeql.yml@main
permissions:
security-events: write
actions: read
contents: read
packages: read
with:
languages: '["javascript-typescript"]'
⚠️ Prerequisite: repo Settings → Advanced Security → CodeQL "Default setup" must be DISABLED, or this advanced-setup workflow is rejected at SARIF upload time.
2.3 .github/workflows/release.yml — on tag v*
Standalone, not the ops reusable: the reusable's release job only does
gh release create --generate-notes. It produces no SHA256SUMS.txt
(required by 09 §5), performs no store submission, and exposes no outputs:,
so a caller cannot reference the zip it built.
name: Release
on:
push:
tags: ['v*']
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
release:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 20
permissions:
contents: write # create the GitHub Release
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with: { node-version: '24', cache: npm }
- run: npm ci
# Same gates as CI — a tag must never ship what a PR would have blocked.
- run: npm run lint
- run: npm run check
- run: npm run knip
- run: npm run coverage
- run: npm run guard
- run: npm run zip # wxt zip → .output/<name>-<version>-chrome.zip
- name: Verify tag matches manifest version
run: |
set -euo pipefail
MANIFEST_VERSION=$(jq -r '.version' .output/chrome-mv3/manifest.json)
TAG_VERSION="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
test "$MANIFEST_VERSION" = "$TAG_VERSION" \
|| { echo "::error::tag $TAG_VERSION != manifest $MANIFEST_VERSION"; exit 1; }
- name: SHA256SUMS
working-directory: .output
run: sha256sum *-chrome.zip > SHA256SUMS.txt
- name: GitHub Release
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
gh release create "$GITHUB_REF_NAME" \
.output/*-chrome.zip .output/SHA256SUMS.txt --generate-notes
- name: Publish to Chrome Web Store
if: vars.CWS_AUTOPUBLISH == 'true'
env:
CHROME_EXTENSION_ID: ${{ secrets.CHROME_EXTENSION_ID }}
CHROME_CLIENT_ID: ${{ secrets.CHROME_CLIENT_ID }}
CHROME_CLIENT_SECRET: ${{ secrets.CHROME_CLIENT_SECRET }}
CHROME_REFRESH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CHROME_REFRESH_TOKEN }}
run: npx wxt submit --chrome-zip .output/*-chrome.zip
announce:
needs: release
uses: poli0981/.github/.github/workflows/announce-release.yml@main
permissions:
contents: read
with:
tag_override: ${{ github.ref_name }}
secrets: inherit
tag_override is required here, and for the same reason the announcement
is a job rather than a caller. The reusable resolves
TAG="${INPUT_TAG:-$EVENT_TAG}" with EVENT_TAG = github.event.release.tag_name
— empty under on: push: tags — so omitting it makes the job exit 1 on
"No release tag available" and the announcement never fires for any release.
The announcement is a job inside this workflow, not a separate
on: release: [published] caller. A Release created by gh release create
under the default GITHUB_TOKEN does not emit an event that starts new
workflow runs, so an event-driven caller would silently never fire.
2.4 .github/workflows/notify-ci-failure.yml
name: Notify CI failure
on:
workflow_run:
workflows: ['CI']
types: [completed]
permissions:
contents: read
actions: read
jobs:
notify:
uses: poli0981/.github/.github/workflows/notify-ci-failure.yml@main
permissions:
contents: read
actions: read
secrets: inherit
The reusable already filters to conclusion == 'failure' on the default
branch, so the caller needs no if:.
3. Chrome Web Store publishing automation
WXT ships publishing built-in: wxt submit (wrapping
publish-browser-extension). One-time local setup: npx wxt submit init
→ walks through creating the Google Cloud OAuth client + refresh token →
produces the four values above → store as repo Actions secrets.
Gating policy:
| Version | Method |
|---|---|
| v1.0.x (first listing + first reviews) | Manual: download the zip from the GitHub Release (not the CI artifact — the Release asset is the one SHA256SUMS.txt covers) → Dashboard upload → fill listing/privacy → submit. First reviews often ask questions; keep a human in the loop. |
| v1.1+ | Automated: the Publish to Chrome Web Store step in §2.3 runs after the Release succeeds, gated on the repo variable CWS_AUTOPUBLISH=true so it can be flipped off instantly if a review dispute is ongoing. |
Notes: uploaded builds still go through CWS review before rollout (automation removes the clicking, not the review). Consider Dashboard "staged rollout" manually for risky releases.
4. Branch/version flow
feat branch → PR (CI green + review) → squash-merge to main
release: bump package.json (semver) → CHANGELOG.md (Keep a Changelog) →
git tag -s vX.Y.Z → push tag → release.yml
- Patch = fixes/translations · Minor = features / any permission or
privacy-tab change (per
09 §4) · Major = breaking format/schema changes (BM JSON version bump).
5. Repo settings checklist (one-time ⚠️)
- Branch protection on
main: require CI, require review, linear history. Required checks are the job names —Quality gatesandBuild + package— not the workflow name. - CodeQL Default setup DISABLED (Settings → Advanced Security),
otherwise
codeql.ymlfails at SARIF upload (§2.2). - Actions secrets: the four
CHROME_*values (afterwxt submit init). - Actions secrets for Discord notifications (all optional — the reusables
skip cleanly when unset, except
DISCORD_CI_WEBHOOKwhichnotify-ci-failure.ymldeclaresrequired: true):DISCORD_CI_WEBHOOK,DISCORD_RELEASES_WEBHOOK,DISCORD_REPO_WEBHOOK,DISCORD_PING_ROLE_ID. - Repo variable
CWS_AUTOPUBLISH=falseinitially. - Dependabot: npm weekly, grouped minors;
github-actionsecosystem too. - Issue templates: bug (asks for browser + a sanitized sample file), feature, translation.
- GPG signing required for tags (matches tracker-repo practice).