Five lenses filed 20; 8 survived verification.
**release.yml would have failed on the first tag.** The `announce` job called
the ops reusable with no `with:` block, but that reusable resolves
TAG="${INPUT_TAG:-$EVENT_TAG}" where EVENT_TAG is github.event.release.tag_name
-- empty, because this workflow is triggered by `on: push: tags`, not
`on: release`. The job would have exited 1 on "No release tag available" for
every release. Filed independently by three lenses and confirmed against the
reusable's actual source; docs/12 §2.3 had the same omission and is fixed too.
Ironically the comment right above it explains why the workflow deliberately is
not event-driven -- which is exactly what makes tag_override mandatory.
**Nothing checked the BUILT manifest.** The unit test reads wxt.config.ts,
which proves what we ask for, not what WXT emits. Those differ: a dev build of
this same config carries ["bookmarks","storage","tabs","scripting"] and
host_permissions ["http://localhost/*"]. Production is clean, but that is
WXT's behaviour, not ours. scripts/check-manifest.mjs now gates the artifact
and runs in both CI and release; verified by editing a built manifest. The
README sentence claiming a test asserted the built manifest was false and is
corrected -- the same overclaim I had already made once verbally.
**The contrast test I added last commit could not see its own bypass.**
TabBar's `.locked { opacity: 0.65 }` composites --fg-muted against the page and
drops the label to 2.83:1. The test reads token values, so alpha applied on top
is invisible to it. Opacity removed; the padlock and title already carried the
signal. TEXT_PAIRS also widened to check the status colours on --bg, not only
--bg-raised.
**docs/09 T3 was signed off with half its mitigation unbuilt.** The row has
always specified a ⚠ badge for dangerous schemes; only the blocking existed. A
`javascript:` bookmark titled "Your bank" rendered identically to a safe one
and its Open button silently did nothing. isBlockedUrl now drives a badge, and
a refused open raises a toast.
Also: the five row action buttons had glyphs as their accessible names (content
beats title in accname), so voice control could not address them; the manifest
test's literal-harvesting regex would have passed a spread or identifier;
resolveNewFolderParent returned a focused unmodifiable folder's id, which every
create rejects; and clipboard.ts was the only new module with no test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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09 — Security & Privacy
1. Privacy guarantees (product-level, non-negotiable)
- Zero data collection. No analytics, no telemetry, no crash reporting, no update pings. There is no server.
- Zero network activity at runtime. Enforced by the canonical grep gate
defined in
08_MV3 §3— that block is the single source of truth for the pattern; do not restate it here. - Everything on-device. Bookmarks are read/written via
chrome.bookmarkslocally; files are parsed in-page and downloaded via Blob URLs.chrome. storage.localholds only settings + legal flag (nostorage.sync— even settings stay off the vendor cloud, consistent with the product promise). - Open source (GPL-3.0) — the privacy claims are verifiable.
2. Threat model
| # | Threat | Vector | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | Malicious import file — markup injection | Crafted <script>/onerror payloads in a .html bookmark file |
DOMParser('text/html') produces an inert document (scripts never execute). We read textContent/getAttribute only. Rendering uses Svelte text interpolation — {@html} is banned repo-wide. |
| T2 | Malicious file — resource exhaustion (huge/deep/zip-bomb-style) | 500 MB file, 1M nodes, 10k-deep nesting | Pre-parse size cap 25 MB; node cap 100 000; depth cap 200 — typed errors, parse aborts early. Lazy tree rendering (§05 §9) bounds DOM size. |
| T3 | Dangerous URLs in imported bookmarks (javascript:, data:) |
Clicking them in #edit | Never rendered as <a href>; "Open" uses tabs.create, which refuses javascript:. UI marks non-http(s)/ftp/file/about/chrome schemes with a ⚠ badge; they are display-only. Imported URLs are stored verbatim (user's data, not ours to censor) — the browser's own bookmark UI applies its own rules. |
| T4 | Data loss from destructive import | User picks "Replace all" casually | Non-skippable auto safety-backup (BM JSON download) before deletion; danger-styled confirm with exact counts; default mode is non-destructive new-folder. |
| T5 | Supply-chain compromise | Malicious transitive dep | Zero runtime deps; dev deps pinned via lockfile; Dependabot + npm audit in CI; Biome installed exact-pinned. |
| T6 | Store-listing impersonation / trademark issues | — | Unique name + linked GitHub; report via CWS if cloned. |
| T7 | XSS via filenames/titles echoed into UI (result cards, toasts) | Weird characters in file name | Same as T1 — text interpolation only; filenames additionally sanitized for the download name (`[\/:*?"<> |
| T8 | Clipboard abuse | "Copy URL" action | Uses navigator.clipboard.writeText on explicit user click only; never reads the clipboard. |
Pass performed 2026-07-26 (Phase 5)
| # | Now enforced by |
|---|---|
| T1 | tests/unit/core/fixtures.test.ts parses malformed/script-injection.html and asserts the payloads survive as inert text. DOMParser('text/html') never executes scripts, and {@html} is barred by npm run guard. |
| T2 | tests/unit/core/limits.test.ts plus the caps in core/limits.ts. Measured: a 100k-node file parses without exhausting anything (11 §6). |
| T3 | malformed/js-url.html at parse level, tests/unit/browser/open-url.test.ts at the point of use — javascript:, data:, file:, chrome:, vbscript: and case-shouted variants are refused before tabs.create — and the ⚠ badge this row has always specified, which isBlockedUrl now drives in TreeRow. A refused open also raises a toast; it used to do nothing at all, which read as a broken button rather than a deliberate refusal. |
| T4 | tests/unit/import/safety-backup.test.ts. |
| T5 | npm audit --omit=dev reports 0 — every open Dependabot alert is development scope. |
| T6 | Human; nothing in code. |
| T7 | sanitizeFilename (tests/unit/browser/download.test.ts); everything else reaches the DOM through Svelte text interpolation. |
| T8 | browser/clipboard.ts — write-only, click-only, never reads. Implemented in Phase 5; it had been specified in 06 §3.3 and here since the start but never built. |
Three gaps this pass closed, all of which had gone unnoticed because nothing mechanical was watching:
- The permission list had no gate at all. Two now exist, and both are
needed.
tests/unit/manifest.test.tsasserts['bookmarks', 'storage']againstwxt.config.ts— what we ask for.scripts/check-manifest.mjsasserts the built artifact, which is not the same thing: a dev build of this identical config emits"permissions": ["bookmarks","storage","tabs","scripting"]and"host_permissions": ["http://localhost/*"], because WXT injects them. Production is clean today, but that is WXT's behaviour, not our enforcement. Both were verified to fail — one by adding'tabs'to the config, the other by editing the built manifest. - "Copy URL" did not exist, so T8 described the mitigation for a feature that was never shipped.
- T3's ⚠ badge did not exist either. The blocking half was real and tested;
the "mark dangerous schemes in the UI" half was not, so a
javascript:bookmark titled "Your bank" rendered exactly like a safe one and its Open button silently did nothing.
3. Secure coding rules (enforced)
{@html}— forbidden. Enforced by the canonical grep gate (08 §3) and review. Biome has no rule for this:noDangerouslySetInnerHtmlis a React rule and does not see Svelte templates.innerHTML,outerHTML,insertAdjacentHTMLassignment — forbidden (same gate).- All user/file-derived strings cross into the DOM only via Svelte text
bindings or
textContent. URLconstructor for any URL handling; no string-splitting of URLs.- No
Math.randomfor anything security-relevant (ids usecrypto.randomUUID()where local ids are needed). - Typed wrappers only for
chrome.*(single audited surface,src/lib/browser/). - Error messages shown to users never include raw file content beyond a ≤120-char excerpt of the offending line (avoids log-injection weirdness in screenshots/issues).
4. Permissions posture
bookmarks + storage, nothing else (justifications in 08 §2). Any PR
adding a permission must update docs 08/09/13 + the store Privacy tab, and is
a minor-version event at minimum.
5. Release integrity
- Builds are content-reproducible from a clean checkout:
npm ci && npm run zip. Verified 2026-07-26 by building the same commit in a fresh clone and in the working tree — every entry in the two zips has an identical name and CRC32. The archives' SHA-256 hashes still differ, becausewxt ziprecords file mtimes and nothing normalizes them (there is noSOURCE_DATE_EPOCHsupport). Do not claim byte-identical rebuilds. - GitHub Releases attach the exact zip uploaded to CWS +
SHA256SUMS.txtso users can verify store build ↔ source correspondence. That works on the released artifact itself, which is the same file in both places — it is not a claim that a third party can rebuild the same hash. - Tags are signed (GPG) — consistent with the tracker-repo signing practice.
6. Vulnerability reporting
SECURITY.md in repo root (⚠️ create at scaffold): report privately via
GitHub Security Advisories; acknowledgment target 72h; fix-or-mitigate target
14 days for High/Critical. No bounty (hobby project) — credit given in
release notes.