- BUILD.md: rebuilding the release packages, written for Firefox Add-ons' source review (Node.js 26 stated outright: the sources archive drops .nvmrc), and useful to anyone checking a store build against the source. - README: a browser/store/requirement table (Edge and Firefox listings not live yet, and said so), the Firefox package on each Release is for checking, not installing; the privacy section names the same CSP in every browser; limits gain Firefox's separators, address and title lengths. - SECURITY.md: the latest version on each of the three stores is supported. - ACCESSIBILITY.md: Firefox and Edge are best effort and untested with assistive technology; separators are drawn but not announced, and Alt+↑/↓ past one leaves the spoken position unchanged — a known limitation. - store/listing.*.md: the AMO and Edge blocks — the two bullets that named Chrome rewritten for browsers in general, one more limitation for Firefox, and each store's fields. Translations best-effort. - CHANGELOG: the 1.3.0 entry under [Unreleased] until the bump. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2.9 KiB
Security Policy
Supported versions
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| The latest version published on the Chrome Web Store, Firefox Add-ons or Microsoft Edge Add-ons | ✅ |
| Anything older | ❌ |
There is no back-porting, and there is nothing for you to do to stay current:
your browser updates extensions once a new version passes store review. You
can see which version you are running in the extension's About tab, on
chrome://extensions, or on about:addons in Firefox.
Reporting a vulnerability
Report privately via GitHub Security Advisories: https://github.com/poli0981/bookmarkmagic/security/advisories/new
No GitHub account? Email security@poli0981.dev instead. Please say up front that it is a security report.
Please do not open a public issue for a security problem.
Include, where possible: the affected version, a description of the impact, and a minimal reproduction. If a bookmark file triggers the issue, sanitize it first:
node scripts/sanitize-bookmarks.mjs your-file.html
That replaces every hostname, path, query value and title while preserving the
structure, encoding and timestamp shape a parser bug actually depends on — so
the sanitized file still reproduces the problem. CONTRIBUTING.md explains what
it keeps and why. Please do not send us a real bookmarks file; we would rather
have a slow reproduction than your browsing history. Anything you do send by
email is kept only as long as it takes to reproduce and fix the issue, and is
then deleted.
Response targets
| Stage | Target |
|---|---|
| Acknowledgement | 72 hours |
| Fix prepared for High/Critical | 14 days |
| Fix reaching users | the above, plus Chrome Web Store review |
That last row is the honest one: a shipped fix has to pass store review before Chrome rolls it out, and that step is not ours to control. If a defect is severe enough to warrant it, we will say so publicly in the advisory so users can mitigate — for this extension, that generally means "do not import untrusted files until the update lands".
This is a hobby project with no bounty programme. Credit is given in the release notes unless you ask otherwise.
Scope
In scope: the extension's parsing, serialization, storage and UI code in this repository, and the release/build pipeline.
Out of scope: vulnerabilities in Chrome itself, and issues that require the user to install a modified build.
Design notes relevant to reporters
The extension holds exactly two permissions (bookmarks, storage), makes no
network requests at runtime, ships no remote code, and never loosens the MV3
default Content Security Policy. Imported files are parsed with
DOMParser('text/html') into an inert document; nodes from that document are
never adopted into the live DOM, and all file-derived strings reach the UI via
text interpolation only. See docs/09_SECURITY_PRIVACY.md for the full threat
model (T1–T8).